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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j). The case 
was assigned to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) on or about August 16, 2005. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Appellant asserts the following issue on appeal: 
Did the District Court error in ruling that even though Defendant refinanced a 
purchase money security interest, the statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) somehow do not apply and as a consequence "[t]hat 
Defendant's security interest in the collateral is junior to the priority secured position of 
Plaintiff as a matter of law." 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The priority of the Defendant's refinanced purchase money security interest was 
argued both by Memorandum and during the oral arguments of the hearing on summary 
judgment. The Defendant also supported the Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-
103(6)(c) argument by submitting affidavit testimony and exhibits, including affidavits 
indicating the intent of the refinancing parties to extend the purchase money priority and 
the UCC-1 filing documents demonstrating that intent. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) provides 
purchase money security priority to a third party creditor who refinances a purchase 
money security interest presents an issue of first impression of law. Issues of law are 
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subject to a correctness standard: Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41 (UT 
2003);Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37, 977 P.2d 1205 (UT 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute between creditors regarding the priorities of their 
respective security interests. Defendant asserts a priority premised upon Utah Code Ann. 
Section 70A-9-103(6)(c), which preserves purchase-money status upon purchase-money 
debt that is refinanced. Plaintiff upon Motion for Summary Judgment successfully 
asserted a nonpurchase money security priority premised upon (a) Plaintiffs filing of a 
general security interest on all of the debtor's crops and equipment prior to the 
Defendant's refinancing of the original purchase-money debt, and (b) the trial court's 
ruling that the Defendant's refinanced debt cannot be traced to the outstanding balance of 
the original purchase money debt within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Rule 
Section 70A-9-103(6)(c), which preserves purchase-money status upon purchase-money 
debt that is refinanced. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As a preface to this factual summary, the Defendant relies upon the well-established 
rule: "When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, "we view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light of the nonmoving party.'" 
Nolan v. Hoopiianina, 528 Utah Adv Rep. 15, 2005 UT App. 272, quoting Wayment v. 
Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, 523 Utah Adv. Rep 39. As the court did in 
Nolan, "We recite the facts of the case accordingly." Id. 
On March 5, 1998, the Pali Brothers (the debtor) purchased two combines from 
Case and financed them through New Holland Credit. New Holland filed a purchase-
money security interest on this purchase-money debt on 3/5/1998 (See attached Exhibit 
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1,2, 3, and 4, to PickrePs First Affidavit). This UCC filing constituted an original 
purchase-money obligation. The parties agree the New Holland's purchase-money 
security interest was entitled to a security priority to Plaintiffs security interest because 
it both (a) predated the Plaintiffs nonpurchase money security interest in all the crops 
and equipment of the debtor; and (b) constituted a valid purchase-money security interest 
that was senior in status to Plaintiffs security interest regardless of the filing date. 
On February 22, 2000 and again on February 26, 2001 Plaintiff (Lewiston State 
Bank) filed a nonpurchase money security interest on all of the debtor's crops and 
equipment. When Plaintiff filed these general security interests a substantial balance 
remained on New Holland's senior purchase money security interest. Accordingly, in 
extending debtor credit in 2000 and 2001, as a matter of financial reality Plaintiff could 
not have relied upon the equity interest in the subject combines that is in dispute in this 
case that can be traced to the outstanding balance on the New Holland debt. 
In early 2002 the Pali Brothers became delinquent in their payments to New 
Holland Credit on the purchase-money obligation for the disputed two combines. To 
avoid default upon New Holland's purchase-money security interest, on February 20, 
2002 the Pali Brothers as debtors negotiated a refinance of the outstanding balance of the 
original purchase money debt, $67, 654.79, with the John Deere on behalf of Defendant 
Greenline. According to the terms of their refinance agreement, the Defendant agreed to 
pay the outstanding balance owed to New Holland on the combines of $67, 654.79 
(Exhibit 10 of PickrePs First Affidavit), then refinance the same equipment for the same 
outstanding balance with the Pali Brothers. The only essential difference between the 
original purchase money debt and the refinanced debt was that the Defendant agreed to 
(a) delay payments for a year to give the Pali Brothers a chance to recover from their 
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financial difficulties, and (b) refinance the same debt at a lesser interest rate.. (Exhibit 11 
of Pickrel's First Affidavit: a four page Variable Rate Loan Contract and Security 
Agreements between the debtor and the Defendant as refinancing creditor). Prior to 
completing the refinance transaction, Defendant requested a lien release from New 
Holland for the combines (Paragraph 6 of Braegger's Affidavit). 
In return for their more favorable refinance terms, the Pali Brothers as debtors 
agreed to give the Defendant "a purchase money security interest in the combines in 
connection with this purchase and resell." (Paragraph 4 of Pickrel's Second Affidavit). 
The Defendant was well aware that the debtors were having financial difficulties in 
making payments to New Holland on the purchase-money debt. According to the 
Affidavit testimony of Defendant's Jay Pickrel, Defendant would not have refinanced the 
combines without insuring that Defendant would have first priority lien. Indeed, Pickrel 
testified that as store manager he would never finance equipment for anything 
approaching "$70,000 without ensuring Greenline a first priority lien position such as a 
purchase-money security interest." (Paragraph 4 of Pickrel's Third Affidavit). Melisa 
Braegger as Defendant's office manager also testified that "Greenline would not have 
purchased the two combines from the Pali Brothers and then financed them with John 
Deere Credit if they did not believe they had a purchase money security interest in the 
combines." (Paragraph 5 of the Braegger Affidavit). 
The refinancing agreement between the debtor and the Defendant Greenline also 
provided as the only "add-ons" to the amount of the original purchase-money debt would 
be ( l )a$10 UCC filing fee to preserve the purchase-money status of the collateral being 
refinanced, and (2) a $150 origination fee (Exhibit 11 to Pickrel's First Affidavit). On 
March 6, 2002, within twenty days of the February 20, 2002 refinancing agreement 
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between the Pali Brothers as debtors and the Defendant as refinancing creditors, the 
Defendant filed the agreed upon UCC purchase-money security interest, for which the 
Pali Brothers had agreed to pay as a $10 "add-on." This agreement and filing was 
intended to ensure that the refinanced collateral received the same purchase money 
priority that the previous creditor, New Holland, was entitled to as the previous purchase-
money creditor (Exhibit 8, to PickrePs First Affidavit). 
In connection with this refinance, the $67, 519.85 in refinanced debt can be 
clearly traced to the outstanding amount of the original purchase-money debt of 
$67,544.79. The $10,626,43 finance charge identified in the refinancing documents as 
the potential total cost of refinancing the debt over the life of the loan, rather than being 
an "add on," was less than the finance charges that would have been assessed under the 
original New Holland debt obligation because the refinance agreement provided a lower 
interest rate than the New Holland agreement (Exhibit 11 of PickrePs First Affidavit). 
Also, even though the Plaintiff was aware that Defendant had refinanced the combines, 
"Lewiston Bank made no claim on the combines when they were purchased from New 
Holland and resold to the Pali Brothers under the March 6, 2002 purchase-money 
security interest and at no time [following the refinancing] did Lewiston ever attempt to 
take possession of the combines under what they claimed was a priority security 
interest." (Paragraph 8 of PickrePs Third Affidavit). 
As a consequence of Defendant's refinance of New Holland's purchase money 
security, the Plaintiff was in the same secured situation they had been prior to the 
transaction: their 2001 and 2002 general security interests in all crops and equipment 
remained subordinate to the same amount of purchase-money priority in the exact same 
collateral that they had been subordinated to prior to the refinance. The only differences 
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between New Holland financing and the Defendant's refinancing were: (1) the "add-
ons" refinanced included a $150 origination fee and a $10 fee for filing the UCC 
purchase money security interest; (2) the debtor Pali Brothers, who at the time of the 
refinancing were delinquent in their payments on the combines to New Holland, obtained 
a delay in making any payments for a year; and (3) the Defendant's total finance 
exposure over the course of the loan, the $10,626.43 finance charge, was less than would 
have been incurred had the New Holland financing agreement. 
As a matter of economic reality, the Defendant's refinancing New Holland's 
purchase-money obligation benefitted all the parties, including the Plaintiff, by (1) 
removing an immediate default and repossession by New Holland Credit of the two 
combines, (2) providing the Pali Brothers with additional time, resources, and lower 
finance charges, and (3) providing the Plaintiff with the benefit of an additional year of 
crops over which they held a security interest from the continued use of the combines. 
Moreover, the extension of the purchase-money priority over the same debt did not 
disadvantage the Plaintiffs security interest which had always been subordinated to the 
New Holland purchase money security interest. The Plaintiff gained, rather than lost, as 
a consequence of the the refinancing even with Defendant retaining purchase money 
priority in the refinanced debt. 
The Pali Brothers made no payments to Defendants under the refinancing 
agreement, and defaulted when the first payment became due. The defendant 
repossessed the combines, repaired them for resell, and sold the first combine on June 
20, 2003 for $36,500 and the second combine for $41,500. This litigation followed 
contesting the respective priorities of the two creditors with respect to the $78,000 
received from the sale of the combines. The Plaintiff in this action, who furnished none 
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of the funds to either purchase or refinance the disputed two combines, claims a windfall 
of the $78,000 they would not have been entitled to if the New Holland debt had not been 
refinanced. They successfully argued in the summary judgment hearing that the 
purchase-money priority New Holland enjoyed in the combines was "transformed" by 
the refinancing into non-purchase-money debt, thereby justifying a windfall to them in 
the amount of the refinanced debt contributed by Defendant. The Defendant claims 
under Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9-103(6)(c) a refinance security priority only in 
the amount that can be traced through their refinancing to the collateral that had been 
subject to the original purchase-money security interest. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
DEFENDANT GREENLINE, AS A NEW REFINANCING CREDITOR, IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 70A-9a-103(6)(c) OVER DEFENDANT'S NONPURCHASE 
MONEY SECURITY INTEREST. 
Several legal issues, as well as most factual issues, related to this dispute over 
security priorities in this case are uncontested. 
First, the original creditor, New Holland, prior to the refinancing of the subject 
combines held a perfected purchase-money priority over Plaintiffs security interest 
under Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-324. New Holland's security filing on March 5, 
1998 held priority over Defendant's general security interests filed on February 22, 2000 
and February 26, 2001, both because under Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-322 New 
Holland security interest enjoyed a "priority in time of filing," and also a priority in 
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status by qualifying as a purchase-money security interest under Utah Code Annotated 
70A-9a-103(l)(b). It is therefore uncontested that had the Pali Brothers defaulted to 
New Holland when they began to suffer financial difficulties in early 2002, then 
Plaintiffs general security claim would have been clearly subordinated to New Holland's 
outstanding balance of $67,544.79. 
Second, the Plaintiff in extending financial assistance to the Pali Brothers in 2000 
and 2001 could not have relied upon the subject combines as collateral to the extent that 
they were subject to New Holland priority security interest in excess of the $67,544.79 
that was later refinanced. 
Third, as recognized by the trial court in its Memorandum decision, New Holland at 
any time could have formally assigned its perfected security interest to the Defendant or 
anyone else and the assignment would have extended New Holland's security priority in 
the collateral. In this regard, the UCC does not bar one creditor from assigning the 
financing of the purchase-money security interest, even if that assignee later refinances 
the security interest. In re Schwartz, 52 B.R. 314, 315 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1985(in a 
refinance case, the court held that "[t]he fact that a purchase-money security interest was 
assigned to one other than the original financer does not cause the security interest to lose 
its purchase-money status"). 
Fourth, New Holland could have refinanced the outstanding balance on the purchase 
money security interest debt on the exact terms contained in the Greenline refinancing 
agreement, without losing its security priority under the express provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c). 
Fifth, according to the uncontested affidavit testimony of Defendant witnesses Jay 
Pickrel and Melissa Braeger, the Defendant's business practice was to require a first-lien 
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priority before entering into any purchase or refinance arrangement. Consistent with that 
business practice, the Defendant conditioned their agreement to refinance the Pali 
Brother's outstanding purchase money debt upon the Pali Brothers agreement to accept 
and pay the $10 UCC filing fee to preserve the Defendant's purchase money priority 
status in the two combines. The Pali Brothers accepted this condition. Pursuant to that 
agreement the Defendant did in fact file the UCC-1 purchase-money security interest 
within twenty days of the date the debtor and Defendant entered into their Variable 
Contract and Loan and Security interest with the Pali Brothers. In accordance with that 
agreement, the Defendant throughout this controversy has always claimed a purchase-
money priority. 
Given these undisputed legal issues and facts, the only issue remaining is whether, 
notwithstanding Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-103(6)(c), Defendant's UCC-1 filing of a 
purchase money security interest, and the intent and expectations of the refinancing 
parties, the Defendant's refinancing of the purchase money debt somehow transformed 
the security interest into a non-preferred security interest? Should the technical fact that 
Plaintiffs nonpreferred security interest predated Defendant's refinancing of an earlier 
existing purchase-money security interest entitle Plaintiff to a priority windfall it would 
not have been otherwise entitled under any other assignment or refinance scenario? 
Should form override substance in this case? In answer to this single issue, the 
Defendant argues that it is entitled to a purchase-money priority over the Plaintiffs 
general security interest under (1) the plain meaning of Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-
103(6)(c); (2) the legislative intent of Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c); (3) the 
common law justification of the "dual-status" rule adopted by Utah Code Annotated 
70A-9a-103(6)(c); (4) the policy reasons underlying Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-
9 
103(6)(c) and the "dual status" rule; and (5) the rationale underlying the purchase money 
priority rules generally. 
I. The Plain Meaning of the Applicable Statute Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-
9a-103(6)(c) provides for the extension of the original purchase money priority to 
the Defendant in this case. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) expressly applies to the 
refinancing transaction between the Pali Brothers as debtors and the Defendant as the 
refinancing creditor. Even the trial court in his Memorandum Decision characterized the 
subject transaction between the Pali Brothers and the Defendant as a "refinance" of the 
original purchase-money debt, but he nonetheless denied the security interest priority 
status within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c). The court 
in essence held that notwithstanding the agreement between the debtor and the 
refinancing creditor to extend the purchase-money priority status of the debt through the 
refinancing, they botched the priority status afforded by Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-
103(6)(c) by filing a UCC-1 purchase money interest rather than obtaining an assignment 
from the original purchase-money creditor New Holland. However this overly legalistic 
and technical interpretation of the "refinance" provisions is neither supported by the 
statute nor consistent with the commonly understood policy that the UCC provisions 
should be interpreted liberally to achieve fairness and efficiency. Instead of 
distinguishing between an assignment of the purchase money priority status from the 
original creditor and an acceptance of the continuation of the priority status by the debtor, 
the statute simply provides as follows: 
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(6) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money 
security interest does not lose its status as such, even if: 
(a) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a 
purchase-money obligation; 
(b) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-
money obligation; or 
(c) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, 
or restructured. (Emphasis added). 
The plain meaning of the language contained within Utah Code Annotated 70A-
9a-103(6)(a) and (c) applies by the statute's terms to the facts of our case. First, the 
subject collateral involved non-consumer goods: two combines used in the Pali Brother's 
farming business. Second, prior to refinancing New Holland had acquired a purchase 
money security interest in the subject collateral. Third, prior to refinancing the 
combines, Plaintiff had acquired a security interest in all of the Pali Brother's crops and 
equipment that was subordinate to the New Holland purchase money security interest. 
Fourth, Defendant's credit transaction by every business practice understanding of the 
term constituted a refinance of the outstanding balance of the purchase-money debt. 
Fifth, the Defendant conditioned their willingness to refinance the purchase-money 
collateral upon their obtaining purchase money priority. Sixth, the debtor and 
refinancing creditor intended to extend the purchase money status to the Defendant 
Greenline. The debtor even agreed to pay for the UCC filing of Defendant's purchase-
money security interest. Finally, the refinancing creditor did in fact file the purchase-
money notice within the twenty day time period following the refinance transaction 
between the debtor and the Defendant Greenline. Accordingly, the statute by its terms 
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expressly applies and controls the priority issue in this case. The statute does not suggest 
in any way that the purchase-money status is "transformed" into non-purchase-money 
debt simply on the basis of the substitution of the identity of the creditors in the 
refinancing transaction. 
II. The Legislative intent underlying the Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c) 
justifies extension of the original purchase money priority to the facts in this case. 
A. The Uniform Commercial Code Amendment UCC 9-103(f)(3) was 
intended to extend purchase money status to purchase money debt that is 
refinanced. 
When redrafting the UCC purchase money provisions in 2000, the drafters were 
specifically concerned over the split of authority in refinance cases between 
"transformation" and "dual-status" jurisdictions. Under the transformation cases, 
refinance "transforms" purchase money debt into non-preferred debt. Under the "dual-
status" rule, the priority status survives refinancing to the extent that the outstanding 
balance in the original debt can be "traced" to the refinanced debt. In choosing the "dual 
status" alternative, the UCC drafters made it clear that purchase money priority is not 
transformed upon refinancing. In accordance with that choice, UCC 9-103(f)(3) was 
specifically amended to provide as follows: 
(f) [No loss of status of purchase-money security interest in on-consumer-goods 
transaction,] In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a 
purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such even if: 
(1) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a 
purchase-money obligation; 
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(2) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-
money obligation; or 
(3) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or 
restructured. 
In the OFFICIAL COMMENT to the amended Uniform Commercial Code 9-
103(f) provisions, the drafters made it clear that the amendment was intended to adopt 
the "dual-status rule" that had been previously recognized by many courts by common 
law analysis, and to reject the alternative "transformation theory": 
For transactions other than consumer goods transactions, this Article approves 
what some cases have called the "dual status" rule, under which a security interest 
may be a purchase-money security interest to some extent and a non-purchase 
money security interest to some extent. ... Some courts have found this rule to be 
explicit or implicit in the words "to the extent," found in former Section 9-107 
and continued in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2). The rule is made explicit in 
subsection (f). For non-consumer-goods transactions, this Article rejects the 
"transformation" rule adopted by some cases, under which any cross-
collateralization, refinancing, or the like destroys the purchase-money status 
entirely. 
In the OFFICIAL COMMENT to UCC 9-103(f) the drafters further explained: 
Subsection (f) buttresses the dual-status rule by making it clear that (in a 
transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction) cross-collateralization and 
renewals, refinancings, and restructurings do not lose its status as such. The 
statutory terms "renewed," "refinanced," and "restructured," are not defined. 
Whether the terms encompass a particular transaction depends upon whether, 
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under the particular facts, the purchase-money character of the security interest 
fairly can be said to survive. Each term contemplates that an identifiable portion 
of the purchase money obligation could be traced to the new obligation resulting 
from a renewal refinancing, or restructuring. (Emphasis added). 
The OFFICIAL COMMENT, therefore, makes it clear that purchase money 
priority turns on the factual issue of whether "an identifiable portion of the purchase 
money obligation could be traced to the new obligation." Under the facts of the case, the 
outstanding amount of the original purchase-money debt of $67,544.79 can be clearly 
traced to the $67,519.85 refinanced debt. Indeed, the whole purpose of the dual status 
rule is to protect such instances of refinancing where the outstanding debt is essentially 
renewed in the refinancing, rather than significantly changed by substantial add-ons that 
make it difficult to even "trace" the original outstanding debt to the refinanced debt. 
B. Utah's verbatim adoption of UCC 9-103(f) in Utah Code Annotated 70 A-
9a-103(6)(c) makes it clear that purchase money priority extends through the 
refinance of purchase money obligations. 
The Utah legislature, effective July 1, 2001, codified the "refinancing" 
provision of UCC 9-103(f)(3) in Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c), thereby 
explicitly adopting the"dual status" rule before the Defendant ever refinanced the loan. 
By the express terms of the statute, refinancing of purchase-money debt does not destroy 
the priority status of the purchase-money debt, to the extent the obligations of the 
purchase-money debt can be "traced" to the refinanced debt. While "add-on" debt or 
additional obligations included in the refinance are not entitled to purchase-money 
priority under the refinance provisions, the amount and terms of the original debt are 
extended security priority. 
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The Utah courts have not had an occasion to discuss whether this priority is 
somehow "transformed if the refinancing creditor is not identical to the original security 
holder. However, the Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-103(f)(3) was explicitly 
adopted to resolve a split amongst the courts regarding the extent to which purchase-
money priority is transformed into non-purchase-money priority upon refinancing. Ilie 
plain meaning of the statute, together with the policy justifications of fairness and 
efficiency underlj ing the ' ''cli lal status" r \ lie apply \ v ith e qual force and effect regardless 
of the identity of the refinancing creditor. A review of the common law meaning and 
Code Annotated 70 A-103 (6)(c) to the facts of this case. 
rationale of fairness and efficiency underlying the applicable "dual status" 
rule, as incorporated into the amended Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c), 
apply to the facts of the instant case and justify extending purchase money priority 
to the outstanding balance of the original debt that can be traced to the refinanced 
debt. 
Prior to the UCC amendment on refinancing (UCC 9-106(f)(3)), the courts split 
between whether purchase-money priority was transformed upon refinancing (the 
"transformation rule") or was preserved to the extent of the outstanding balance on the 
purchase money debt (the "dual status rule"). The transformation courts justified their 
rule by an o\ erly legalistic reading of the "antecedent debt" proscrir ' ' mrchase 
money debt and by the difficulty of tracing the outstanding purchase money debt through 
debt" argument by referring to the "to the extent" language contained in the UCC 
provisions defining purchase money debt; (2) refuted the practical problem of tracing " 
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by limiting the amount of the priority afforded post-refinanced debt to the dollar amount 
that could be traced to the outstanding balance at the time of the refinance; and (3) 
recommended the "dual status" alternative by emphasizing the fairness and efficiency 
served by extending priority status to refinanced debt. 
A. Transformation Theory: the transformation theory was adopted by those 
courts concerned with the "antecedent debt" language of the UCC in defining 
purchase money security and the difficulty in "tracing" the outstanding balance of 
the purchase money debt through complex refinancing transactions. 
According to courts that adopted the "transformation rule," if a debtor refinances 
collateral that is subject to a purchase-money security interest, and any additional debt is 
"added-on" then the purchase-money priority is "transformed" into nonpurchase money 
status. The courts reasoned (much like Judge Low in this case) that because the purpose 
of a refinancing loan is to pay off an "antecedent debt," contrary to the explicit language 
defining a purchase money interest under the UCC 9-107, any refinancing necessarily 
transforms purchase money debt into antecedent debt, which by definition would not 
qualify for purchase money treatment. Matthews v. Transamerica Financial Services, 
724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984)(per curiam), citing with approval In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655 
(Bankr.M.D.N.C. 1980); In re Gillie, 96 B.R. 689 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1989). 
The courts justified the transformation rule on two grounds. Some courts early on 
suggested (much like Justice Low in this case) that refinancing does not satisfy the UCC 
definition of purchase money because refinancing is not made to enable the creditor to 
acquire rights in the collateral (which he already possesses as a consequence of the 
original purchase money obligation), but instead is used to pay "antecedent debt." In re 
Jones, 5 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980)). However, this Jones "antecedent 
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debfargument both ignores the "to the extent" language of UCC 107 and ignores the 
economic reality "underlying the refinancing transaction \ 1th 3ugh in techni :al form the • 
original debt is cancelled, as a matter of economic reality the outstanding balance is 
absorbed, transferred, renewed, or refinanced into the refinanced loan obligation. 
Recognizing this economic reality, many of the transformation courts shifted their 
justification for the transformation rule away from the legalistic "antecedent debt" 
argument, to the argument that refinancing creates a practical difficulty of apportioning 
the pre- and post-refinance obligations. If the refinance involves financial "add-ons," in 
t h e sense « •:s. n teres t charged, and/or t h e collateral rel ied 
u p o n in the refinance, the entire debt is transformed into nonpurchase m o n e y debt un le s s 
ii sitatuterv or i*ni il cm, fnal iiiirrlijiiisin o i s t s for t iden i imni ! , 1 (he extent U* e l i h h Ihr 
outstanding balance o f the original purchase m o n e y security interest can b e differentiated 
- *.! - rust Bank of Alabama, Nat. Ass \ t v Bot •g (;:f rt i, • „ ter ' ' 
Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1243, rehearing denied, 774 F.2d 1179)(11th Cir. 
1985)( "[w]ithout some guideline, legislative or contractual, the court should not be 
required to distill from a mass of transactions the extent to which a security interest is 
purchase money"... "[u]nless the lender contractually provides some method for 
determining the extent to which each item of collateral secures its purchase money, it 
effectively gives up its purchase money status"); In re Snipes, 86 B.R 1006 (Bankr. 
W.D.Mo. C.D.1988)(discussing the transformation and dual-status rules, and adopting 
the transformation approach because the refinancing agreement did not provide for any 
method of allocating pa> met its between the origii ml debt at i ;:! tl le coi isolidated debt). 
In these transformation jurisdictions, the critical importance of the "method of 
allocating" argument (rati lei than tl le "antecedent debt'11 argi lment) is re v ealed h "it i. 
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those very courts adopt the opposite outcome if the method of allocating payments can be 
established by statute or the contract. In re Cersey, 321 B.R. 352, 354 (Bankr. M.D.Ga. 
2004)(in a transformation jurisdiction, the court distinguished the transformation rule as 
adopted for the Eleventh Circuit in Southtrust to the extent that the contract provided a 
coherent basis for allocating payments between the original purchase money debt and the 
"add-ons"). 
B. Dual-Status Theory: the dual status rule was adopted by courts as more 
consistent with the "to the extent" language of the UCC that qualifies the antecedent 
debt argument and the fairness and efficiency of extending purchase money priority 
to refinanced debt. 
Many courts rejected both the overly legalistic "antecedent debt" and the "no 
method of allocating" justification for the transformation rule in favor of a dual status 
rule. The analysis and explanation given for rejecting the "transformation rule" in 
favor of the "dual-status" alternative by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit in In re Billings v. Avco Colorado Industrial Bank, 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1988) 
is illustrative. In Billings the debtor had purchased furniture on credit from the "Factory 
Outlet Store." The debtor had given the Factory a purchase money security interest in the 
furniture, and the Factory had assigned the obligation to another creditor who financed 
the transaction. Thereafter, at the request of the debtor, who was having trouble making 
the payments (much like the facts of the instant case), the creditor refinanced the 
obligation to reduce the monthly installment payments. To effect this transaction, the 
parties cancelled the old note (again much like the facts of the instant case), and 
substituted a new note and a new security interest (much like Greenline did with the Pali 
Brothers). This refinancing note changed the terms of the original security debt by 
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extending the time for repayment (benefitting the debtor much like the facts in the instant 
case) and increasing the . • „ . . . • • i= •'• s 
instant case where the interest rate change benefitted the debtor as well). The creditor 
continued to claim a purchase money interest, but took no additional collate • i "at as secui: it> 
(similar to the facts in the instant case). The outstanding balance financed by the 
refinancing note remained essentially the same, except the debtor "added-on"additional 
fees for credit life, accident and health insurance, a filing fee, and a cash advance to the 
debtors (add-on fees that far exceed the minimal add-on fees added by Greenline in the 
instant case). 
When the debtor in Billings defaulted and filed for bankruptcy, the debtor sought 
to avoid (In" i mill of \i IHTI <W\ (IN1 liiiiiilnir iitnln flic luitliiifffr y t mlr l>v .induing that 
the refinance had "transformed" the purchase money status of the credit transaction into a 
lie i lpi irehasemonej debt, R eje ctii ig this "transform 1:^ 1 M .:" • • '" -s-
court held that the purchase-money priority was preserved throughout the refinancing 
despite the add-ons ana . ._• changes in the debt obligation I lie (list! ict com iirt affirmed. 
The single issue on appeal was whether under the "antecedent debt" argument, the 
purchase money security priority had been transformed by refinancing? 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the 
transformation argument and affirmed by adopting the dual status rule. The court 
observed that state law related to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) controls the 
issue of whether refinancing transforms the purchase money security interest into a non-
purchase money security interest. The court noted that under the then-existing UCC 
provisions in Colorado, the UCC omitted any explanation of whether a purchase-money 
sec •! iiit) interest 1 : 'Ses its statu is 1 ip oi 11: efinai icing (the omissioi 11 JCC 9 103(f)(3) rectifies 
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by stating it does not). In examining the common law response to this omission, the 
court observed that some courts, adopting a transformation theory, refused to extend the 
purchase money status through refinancing if the refinancing seeks to extend the 
purchase money protection beyond the amount of the outstanding balance on the 
purchase price. 838 F.2d at 407. The court identified two reasons underlying this 
"transformation rule": (1) that purchase money security cannot exist when collateral 
secures additional debt or "add ons" and (2) the refinancing transaction creates a new 
loan to pay off an "antecedent debt," The court rejected both justifications for denying 
continued priority status: 
The problem with the first rationale ... is that it ignores the precise wording of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-107 of the U.C.C. provides that a security 
interest is a purchase money security interest ""to the extent' that the loan enables 
the debtor to purchase new property." This language would be meaningless if an 
obligation could never be considered only partly a purchase money debt. 
The problem with the second rationale of the transformation rule is ... it ignores 
the possibility that the refinancing merely renewed the debt, rather than creating 
new debt. 838 F2d 405, 408. 
Citing substantial authority, the court rejected the "transformation" theory and 
held that "refinancing does not automatically transform a purchase money security 
interest." Id. At 409. In place of the "transformation rule" the court justified adopting the 
alternate "dual status rule" because it better comports with the "to the extent" language of 
the UCC and serves the important policy considerations of fairness and efficiency that 
are ignored by the "transformation rule." The court explained: "The basic problem with 
the automatic 'transformation' rule is that it discourages creditors who have purchase 
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money security interests from helping their debtors work out of financial problems 
without bankruptcy and -,...** .. . • endering the collateral securing the (let t """ I :!! at : 109 
Applied to the facts of that case (and also relevant to the instant case), the Court 
observed: "The instant case is an excellent example. These debtors apparently needed 
lower monthly payments on their debt. In a 'transformation' jurisdiction the creditor 
could not cooperate without giving up its right to protect its security if debtors filed 
bankruptcy." Id. At 409. 
The Court further noted that a change in interest rate in a refinancing transaction 
"doesn. . *: J - •• '• • ..•^-- • l obligation is extinguished "Id at 409 n. 4. ' I he 
Court added that the "transformation" rule "jumbles priorities among creditors." Id. At 
JI i|iMlmg (ii/hit ( Id I1 I" il • 11--v | he ' , it in irfii'iiir 1 , \u U thai tin purchase-
money status had been extinguished as a consequence of the refinancing, commented: 
'""'"W1 hen a deb secured b) a pi irehase i i loney secur it) Ii iterest is refinai ice cl, and the 
identical collateral remains as security for the refinanced debt, then neither the debt nor 
the security has changed its essential character." The court also noted in c . i (relevant 
to the instant case) that a holder of a PMSI may assign or transfer its security interest to a 
third party unrelated to the pxirchase without losing its preferred status. 83-8 F.2d at 406. 
Many other courts came to the same conclusion for the same reasons. For 
example, In re Schwartz, 52 B.R. 314, 316 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1985) the court held that 
even a novation of a purchase money security interest does not destroy its purchase 
money status when it is refinanced. In Schwartz the debtors purchased certain goods and 
granted the seller a pi irehase n lonej J security interest • * l v < / ! * * - -? 
security interest was assigned to a new creditor. The new creditor later refinanced the 
loan "whereby ne^ • . were generated, a i le1 > s = z\ n it) agre -ei :i i mt \ as 
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signed and 'fresh cash' given to the debtors. By this act of refinancing the parties 
intended a novation of the earlier loan contract by the new one." 52 B.R. at 314. 
Nonetheless, the court held that under the dual-status rule the purchase-money priority 
had been preserved to the extent of the outstanding balance at the time of the refinance. 
The court explained: "Even granting that a novation has been implemented to cancel the 
original loan document creating the purchase-money security agreement, such a novation 
does not nullify the purchase money aspect of the original transaction." 52 B.R. at 316-
17. 
Similarly, in In re Krueger, 172 B.R. 572 (N.D.Ohio 1994), the issue was whether 
a refinancing of a purchase-money debt, which included the debtor receiving an 
additional $1000, extinguished the purchase-money status of the original outstanding 
balance. In rejecting this transformation result, the court held that "[t]he fact that the 
Refinancing included finance charges incurred by the Debtors on the Loan, provided for 
longer term of repayment than the Loan, and provided for increased monthly payments 
does not represent strong support for the Debtor's position that the Refinancing 
extinguished [creditor's] purchase money security interest." (172 B.R. 574). In 
recognizing the purchase-money priority for the amount of the original debt, the court 
found the intent of the debtor and creditor critical (the same intent reflected in the 
refinancing documents in this case): "in view of the fact that the Refinancing specifically 
contemplated [the creditor's] retention of a security interest in the Furniture, the Court 
cannot conclude that the parties intended to extinguish [the creditor's] purchase money 
security interest in the Furniture." 172 B.R. at 575. Accordingly, the court held: 
"Therefore, [the creditor's] security interest retains its purchase money character to the 
22 
extent of the payoff balance of the Loan at the time of the Refinancing less subsequent 
payments made by the Debtors/M72B.R. at 574 
The court in In re Short, 170 B.R. 128 (S.D.I11.1994) similarly relied upon the 
intent of the debtor and the refinancing creditor in adopting the "dual-status rule" for a 
refinanced purchase-money security interest. There the court held that the degree of 
financial change in the underlying obligation determines whether the PMSI status 
continues following refinance. 170 B R at 13< \ In response to the argument (also 
posed in this case by Judge Low) that refinanced debt fits within the language of 
"antecedent debt'* pi oscribed for purchase-monej debt I mdei th 3 I JCC the zoui t foi iiid 
the "to the extent" language of UCC 9-107 determinative: 
Asecurif'y mleresf is J "[UIK'II i \ iiiumo, Mitiiil, ml \ 4' to the cxw ni fLtl il i< 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; 
or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives 
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in ... collateral... (i 70 1 K. at 132). 
According to the court in Short, the "to the extent" language of 9 10 7 is more 
compatible with the "dual-status rule" than the "transformation rule" "to the extent" that 
purchase money priority is extended only to the amount of the outstanding balance of the 
original purchase money debt: 
the "dual-status rule" "is premised on the language of section 9-107, which 
provides that a lien is a purchase money security interest "to the extent" that it is 
taken to secure the purchase price of collateral. Accordingly, the purchase money 
security interest ta* •- ' v ; m>v-* • * * ^T 
balance remaining unpaid on the original purchase money loan. See Russell v. 
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Associates Financial Services Co. (In re Russell), 29 B.R. 270, 273-74 (Bankr.W.D. 
Okl.l983).(170B.R.atl33). 
The court identified the "tracing" problem as the key challenge for implementing 
the dual status rule: 
The difficulty with the dual status rule lies in determining the extent of the 
purchase money interest remaining after refinancing.... When a purchase money 
loan has been consolidated with nonpurchase money debt and payments have 
ensued, some method of applying payments between the purchase money and 
nonpurchase money portions of the refinanced loan is necessary so that the 
purchase money collateral secures only its own price and does not remain as 
collateral for the entire obligation. 
After weighing the strengths of the dual status rule against the single "tracing" 
problem associated with the transformation rule, the court adopted the dual status 
alternative: 
the dual status rule more closely adheres to the statutory language of Section 9-
107 while effecting the policy behind [the priority rules]. The "to the extent" 
language of 9-107 clearly contemplates that a loan maybe partially purchase 
money and partially nonpurchase money, depending on the circumstances of its 
creation. 170 B.R. at 134. 
The court in Geist v. Converse County Bank, 79 B.R. 939 (D.Wyo. 1987) also 
adopted the dual status rule and applied it to a creditor's refinancing of collateral. The 
court criticized the transformation rule as overly legalistic and contrary to the language of 
theUCC: 
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Courts accepting the transformation rule reason that refinancing transforms a 
purchase money security interest into an ordinary one because the refinancing 
does not enable the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. This reasoning, 
however, not only exalts form over substance, but moreover ignores the preamble 
to U.C.C. Section 9-107 ... which states that a security interest is a purchase 
money security interest "to the extent" that it si taken by one making a loan that 
enables a debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. 79 B.R. at 942. 
In adopting the dual status rule, the court explained: "[although the refinancing 
purchase money security interest after refinancing is nevertheless preserved to the extent 
that the balance remainir i. is transfer red t 3 the i € new all, nc te ' " Id 
Again in In re Hill, 226 B.R. 284 (Bankr.Ct. 1998), the bankruptcy court 
fc lie • A eel the "" 'di lal status" i ule It i i" • " \ * II the debtor purchased certain items • : f household 
goods and furnishings. The debtor financed the purchase by giving to the seller a 
promissory note and a security interest. That note and security interest were then 
assigned to Norwest (relevant to the economic reality, if not formal assignment, in the 
instant case). Later Norwest (a nonpurchase money creditor) refinanced the loan. In the 
refinance Norwest advanced $500 in additional funds and the debtor gave additional 
collateral consisting of additional items of household goods. When the bankruptcy was 
filed the debtor sought to avoid the security interest by Norwest by arguing that the add-
ons had transformed the purchase money debt into nonpurchase money debt. In rejecting 
re Billings v. Avco Colorado Industrial Bank, 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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Many bankruptcy courts, district courts, and the United States Courts of Appeal 
for the Third, Eighth, and Tenth circuits adopted a "dual status rule" for the refinance of 
purchase-money security interests as more consistent with both the language of the UCC, 
and the principles of fairness and efficiency underlying the UCC. Pristas v. Landus of 
Plymouth, Inc., 742 F.2d 797, 800-01 (3rd Cir. 1984)(in a refinancing case the court 
observed that consolidating several loans did not destroy the purchase-money character 
of a security interest and explained that "the "transformation rule' is misguided because it 
fails to consider the import of the critical language defining purchase money in section 9-
107 - 'to the extent.' By overlooking that phrase, the 'transformation' courts adopt an 
unduly narrow view of the purchase-money device. Their reasoning is inconsistent with 
the Commercial Code, which gives favored treatment to those financing arrangements on 
the theory that they are beneficial both to buyers and sellers"); In re Hemingson, 84 B.R. 
604 (Bankr. D.Minn. 1988)(holding that under Minnesota law the refinancing of a 
purchase money loan of farm equipment did not destroy the "purchase money" character 
of the original debt: "This court accepts the Mual status' rule because it gives credence to 
the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 9-107 states that a security interest is a purchase 
money security interest to the extent that it is taken by one making a loan that enables a 
debtor to acquire rights in the collateral. The courts that follow the transformation rule 
merely exalt form over substance"); Bond's Jewelers, Inc. V. Linklater (In re Linklater), 
48 B.R. 916 (Bankr. D.Nev. 1985)(holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was 
not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a 
subsequent retail installment contract and explaining: "If the allocation can be made, the 
purchase money security interest will remain intact to the extent that the collateral 
continues to secure its own price. Purchase money security interests that secure other 
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goods will be deemed nonpurchase money only to the extent that they secure the other 
transformation rule, in part, because its effect is to "jumble priorities among creditors, 
and to defeat the very reason for having a priority system'' ); 1 n re Russell . h ), • 
274 (Bankr.W.D.Okl.l983)(in denying that a refinanced and consolidated loan that had 
been marked "P/\1DU was thereby transformed into nonpurchase money debt, the court 
reasoned "[t]he only way 'to the extent' [of UCC 9-107] can be given meaning is to find 
that a secured debt may be split into two parts, a purchase money part constituting so 
much of the debt as represents the price of the collateral and a nonpi irehase money part 
constituting ^add on' debt"); In re Parsley, 104 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.l988)(in 
followin • 'V* .!•• ' .* - s ' • ' • • ; • v ; a 
security interest to the extent that the debtor has never paid the purchase price"); In re 
Ionosphere Clubs, In : ,, 123 IE! R 1,6 6, 1 / 1 (I991)(i dentifyii ig tl: le dual stati is i ule as the 
modern trend and explaining that "[u]nder [the dual-status] approach, the relevant 
cp' .M> ii . i interest in the collateral as security for 
the purchase price obligation, not whether the purchased property also serves or will 
serve as collateral for other debts of the purchaser"). 
C. The Trial Court Misinterpreted the Tracing Issue in Determining 
Whether a Refinanced Purchase-Money Security Interest is Entitled to Preserve the 
Original Purchase-money Status. 
The trial court in his Memorandum decision held that Defendant's priority claim 
could not succeed under the statute because the amount it efin : u iced b> the E> sfendant 
could not be "traced" to the outstanding balance of the original purchase-money security 
interest as required by Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-103(6)(c). However, the court's 
decision clearly misinterprets the tracing requirement under the statute. 
In the OFFICIAL COMMENT to the amended refinancing provision, the UCC 
drafters discussed the "tracing" issue as it related to comparing the outstanding balance 
of the original purchase money debt with the amount of the debt refinanced, rather 
comparing a continuity of the original UCC filing document and any successive 
assignments. Contrary to the trial court's formalistic suggestion that the original UCC-1 
filing must be traced to the re-financed UCC filing through a formal assignment 
document, the "tracing" the UCC drafters clearly had in mind involves correlating the 
amount of the outstanding purchase-money debt to the refinanced debt. The OFFICIAL 
COMMENT that the court misinterprets by its focus on tracing the UCC filing status is 
the following: 
Whether the terms [of the refinancing] encompass a particular transaction 
depends upon whether, under the particular facts, the purchase-money character 
of the security interest fairly can be said to survive. Each term contemplates that 
an identifiable portion of the purchase money obligation could be traced to the 
new obligation resulting from a renewal refinancing, or restructuring. (Emphasis 
added). 
In his Memorandum Decision when the court found that the refinanced debt 
cannot be "traced" to the original purchase money debt, the court ignored the obvious 
economic reality that "an identifiable portion of the purchase money obligation could be 
traced to the new obligation resulting from a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring." 
Instead of focusing on the amount of the debt, the key tracing issue in all the refinancing 
cases, the court relied exclusively upon formally tracing UCC filing documents: asking 
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only whether the Defendant had received from the prior creditor New Holland a formal 
I i^;..... ,-i •. • o vAUM,} :\ . J L. n us misinterpretation 
of "tracing" requirement makes no sense if one examines the issues discussed in the 
context of the respective "transformation" and the "dual-status" cases. In all of these 
cases the courts in discussing the issue of "tracing" ask whether the outstanding dollar 
balance of the original purchase money obligation can be traced to the dollar amount 
contained in the more complex refinancing or consolidation transacts * •; -
significant additional debt is added, the collateral is substantially changed, the terms of 
the financing significantly are altered to the disadva^tn^ . *h*h 
difficult to identify the original purchase-money debt in the final terms of the refinance. 
identical with or more favorable to the debtor, then consistent with the OFFICIAL 
COMMENT t :> the amended pro isic n , it is easy to "trace" an "identifiable portion of the 
purchase money obligation ... to the new obligation resulting from ... refinancing." 
I udtiii^ v»i pre-refinancing and post-refinancing 
debt is pellucidly clear, notwithstanding the court's confused suggestion to the contrary. 
1 i the original purchase-money obligation owing New Holland for the 
combines was $67, 654.79. The Defendant Greenline refinanced essentially the same 
amount, "adding on" only;, , ling fee to preserve the purchase-money status, 
and a $ 150 origination fee. The additional amount identified by the court i i I lis 
Memorandum Decision for the "finance costs" of $10,626,43 were actually less than the 
financing costs that would have been owiii^, under llir New 11< 11,i I J pui m II.J * ino-nev 
debt, because the Defendant Greeline reduced the interest rate on the loan and 
consequently : • - •. . . , c „ / a c e d 
2: (; • 
favorably to the outstanding purchase-money obligation owing to New Holland at the 
time of the refinance. 
The court's confusion over the "tracing" issue contributed to the court's 
confusion over whether the debtor and the Defendant "intended" to continue the 
purchase-money status of the "traced" balance through the refinancing. As a 
consequence, the court erred in holding as irrelevant on the issue of whether the 
Defendant and the debtor intended to preserve the purchase-money status, the following 
facts (which were part of the record and which the court had to interpret in favor of the 
nonmoving party in the hearing for summary judgment):(l) the Defendant conditioned 
the refinancing of the New Holland debt upon the Pali Brothers accepting the Defendant 
as a substitute purchase-money creditor; (2) the Defendant memorialized this agreement 
on the issue of preservation of priority by including $10 cost for the UCC filing as one of 
only two "add-ons" included in the refinancing documents (the other fee was $150 for an 
origination fee); (3) the Defendant filed the new purchase-money UCC filing within 
twenty days of the refinance, as required by the UCC filing requirements; and (4) the 
Defendant treated the security interest as having purchase-money priority throughout the 
term of the loan and throughout the default dispute. Because the court held that the only 
way the prior security interest could be "traced" to the refinancing is through a formal 
UCC assignment (which the court believed acknowledged would have been outcome 
determinative to the priority issue), the court misconstrued the "tracing" issue underlying 
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c) and disregarded the clear intent of the 
parties to continue the purchase money status through the refinance. 
According to the common law rationale for requiring tracing, the outstanding 
purchase money debt should receive continued purchase-money status that can be traced 
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to the outstanding balance at the time of the refinance and any "add-ons" should receive 
lumniudiiist (Homey sLilus Priority should be preserved for the outstanding purchase 
money debt throughout refinancing "to the extent" the outstanding balance wide? 
purchase money debt can be "traced" to the refinanced amount. Under the tracing rule, if 
a refinancing creditor "adds-on" additional de< ••**"• 
standing obligation of the debtor, then the purchase money status is preserved only "to 
the extent" that it can be traced 
The UCC adoption of 9-103 (f)(3) and the Utah adoption of the verbatim 
provisioi • - • • * K . - . O ^ must be understood and 
applied in the context of the dual-status cases that provide the policy justification for the 
dinf -littiis ink, (!L- pnunly >l,ilu t *|H>MI*I I M; retained in this case because the pre-
refinancing debt can be traced to the post-refinancing debt and extension of priority 
si policy considerations of fairness and efficiency. 
IV. The policy justifications of fairness and efficiency underlying I Hnh I YMIC 
Annotated Section 70A-9-103(6)(c) argue in favor of extending purchase money 
priority to the refinanced debt in this case. 
Both the dual status cases and UCC commentators have justified extending 
purchase money priority in those instances vvluic principles nl lainicss ,nul I'lliciency 
argue in favor of extending the priority. According to the fairness justification, if a 
general security interest attaches a, On \hv oiipnttl pi.idi.ise n i n a ) seainl1 Iciest 
existed, there is no change to the creditor's security status upon refinancing. Therefore, it 
would not be " archase money priority to the 
refinanced debt, but it would be unfair to the refinancing creditor to lose the priority 
unancing the general security interest holder has 
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available the exact same collateral available upon default as they had available when the 
loan was originally made. (Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities 
Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143,1167-75 (1979); Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for 
the Financing Buyer, 85 Yale L.J. 1, 6-7 (1975); Lacy, Conflicting Security Interests in 
Inventory and Proceeds under the Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
41 S.C.L.Rev. 247, 276-78 (1990); Nickles, Setting Farmers Free: Right in the 
UnintendedAnomalyofU.C.C. Section 9-312(2), 71 Minn. L.Rev. 1135,1171-75 
(1987). 
For example, in In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1960), in granting a later 
acquired purchase money priority over a tax lien, the court observed: 
such a [purchase money] lender as Commercial has enriched the taxpayer's estate 
by the amount loaned to the taxpayer. For this reason it is not unreasonable to 
allow it a corresponding security interest in the fruit of the borrowed money, with 
the government relegated to the borrowing taxpayer's net after the lender is 
reimbursed. The government has suffered no diminution of the assets which were 
available to satisfy its tax claim before the loan. 280 F2d at 410. 
The result in the instant case should be the same for the same reasons. Greenline 
enriched the debtor's estate by the amount loaned to refinance the purchase money debt 
for which the debtor was in default. If the Plaintiff is relegated to receiving the debtor's 
net after the Defendant Greenline is reimbursed (the dual-status result and the result 
required by Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c), the Plaintiff will have 
suffered "no diminution of the assets which were available to satisfy its [general security 
interest] claim before the loan." The Plaintiff can not argue that it has been treated 
unfairly in being unable to benefit from a financial contribution it neither created nor 
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relied upon in making its loans. Fairness does not require a windfall to the Plaintiff 
simply because Ihc IJulcinJitiil did not obtain a formal assignment of New Holland's prior 
purchase money status. 
Extending priority status to the refinanced debt is not only fair it is also efficient. 
Encouraging refinancing by extending priority status in »111 111'11111 111 iI s 1.1111 min n I >111111 c v 
is efficient in encouraging refinancing where the debtor finds it expedient for a variety of 
reasons. Extending purchase money statu\ IIIITMI^ II IVIMKIIV IIIJL« saves rflii'i ncy in 
encouraging subsequent lenders to extend credit and to prevent earlier lenders from 
frustrating a borrower's attemn . : . . . • • 
Nickles at 1173. Just as allowing later acquired purchase money interests to take priority 
over floating lie • .*!• : . ' • ,
 ; . nanuag prevents a monopoly in 
the debtor's access to credit. Jackson and Kronman, Secured Financing at 1167. In this 
s^i' ^ ;[•. • : v dnancing promotes competition among creditors 
and reduces transaction costs to debtors, without unfairly imposing a penalty on existing 
cmhlrr," Vi IN ni I II n. IUHSC oil than they were prior to refinancing. Nickles at .1173-
74. 
These policy considerations of fairness and efficiency make sense as applied to 
the facts of the instant case. At the time of the refinance, the Pali Brothers ^ > *?•.•••.. i y 
iL iuent in their payments to New Holland Credit. New Holland Credit could have 
immediately repossessed the two combines and the Plaintiff w nhl lv,i\c Ivul i rh nin c nl 
recovering anything from the productive capacity of the combines. If the refinancing 
rule were as Plaintiff suggests, 11\ (IW. ^  • ' Greenline would 
not work with the debtor in an attempt to stave off bankruptcy by delaying immediate 
payment obligatic.-* - \-.-- >-> •• !- ^ payments can be made at a lower 
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monthly payment schedule, or lowering interest rates. Consequently, not only would 
the debtor be disadvantaged, the general secured creditors would also lose the advantage 
of a temporary credit reprieve. The initial purchase-money creditor would have to 
enforce strictly the terms of the purchase-money security interest to avoid loss of the 
purchase-money priority status. Everyone would be disadvantaged with no apparent gain 
to anyone. By assisting the debtor to stay in business through refinancing, the debtor has 
an increased the business opportunity of the debtor to recover financially with no 
increased exposure to anyone. 
V. The purposes and policies underlying the definition of purchase money security 
interests under Utah Code Annotated 70A-9a-324 also justify extension of the 
original purchase money priority. 
Even without the benefit of either the common law dual status rule or the 
specific statutory reference to refinance under Utah Code annotated Section 70A-9a-
103(6)(c) the refinancing transaction in this case fits within the purposes and policies 
underlying the statutory definition of a purchase money security interest. Under Utah 
Code annotated 70A-9a-103(l)(b), "'purchase-money obligation' means an obligation of 
an obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable 
the debtor to acquire rights in the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used, " 
(Emphasis added). Utah Code annotated Section 70A-9a-103(2) further provides: "A 
security interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest: (a) to the extent that the 
goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest..." 
Apart from the dual status "to the extent" argument discussed above, under any 
interpretation of the refinancing in this case, the Defendant, as part of the refinance 
transaction, advanced $67,544.79 to New Holland "to enable the debtor to acquire rights 
34 
in the use of the collateral is the value is in fact so used." By making the refinancing 
i«i nil, llio IJdeiuhiil enabled"' the debtor Pali Brothers to both avoid an impending 
default and to acquire rights in the use of the collateral (the combine** 
money financed was in fact used for that very purpose, extending the debtor's use of the 
combines another year. Without the refinance the <M^i i " I<I ii M *,* <k1liu>i'ied o"t Ne^ 
Holland's loan and would have lost the use of the combines. Moreover, Defendant's 
claim of priority through the refinance < -v * •- •  o goods are 
purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest." 
Grant Gilmo -^  w1i • i > I' 1111 • p r n\»' 11>111 < 111 • . i • - ' , suggested that the 
"enabling" requirement for purchase money status should not be rigidly interpreted. 
Grant Gilme < . ,,. - ; j j j . • * :->63). He 
asserted that if a loan transaction appears to be "closely allied" to the purchase 
transiiffjiti'iii 11 IIIIIII1. '.In mill IIIIHIII iliai a rivlSl has been created. Gilmoreat 1374. T h e U C C 
commentators White and Summers, following Gilmore, observe that w 111 l< 11 i • 1 If * 
I 11 u 11 c guidance as to how broadly the requirement "to enable the debtor acquire 
rights in or the use of collateral," should be interpreted thev ml n ii'minmeinl Hi 1 
requirement should be liberally construed: 
"If the loan transaction appears to be close! \ ?»lliul In (In pun base Iriin^ulmn, 
that should suffice. The evidence intent of paragraph (b) is to free the purchase-
money concept from artificial limit-.ilions; nj',1 1 • idhcreiu'e U\ p.ulK.ul.11 formalities 
in sequences should not be required." 4 White and Summers,Uniform 
Commercial Code [4lfl t<] \w^\ < ^iH-ung . 'vj.uumore, Security 
Interests in Personal Property 782 (1965). 
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Accordingly, in interpreting the requirement that "the creditor give value to 
enable the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral," the courts should liberally consider 
whether the loan was "to enable" a debtor to acquire use in the subject collateral and 
whether the value given was in fact used for that purpose. Ingram v. Ozard Prod. Credit 
Ass % 468 F.2d 564, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1972); In re McHenry, 71 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1987); In re Dillon, 18 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr.E.D.Cal. 1982). 
For example, the court in In re Enterprises Industries, Inc. v. Sutherland Press, 
259 B.R. 163 (Bankr.N.D. Calif. 2001) liberally construed the "enabling" requirement as 
applied to a third party creditor's advancement of financing. In Sutherland the debtor 
entered into an initial purchase money security interest for the purchase of a press, but 
the debtor later required additional financing from a separate third party financier to 
obtain possession of and title to the press. In connection with this later transaction, the 
debtor executed a purchase order for a press from the seller and first creditor. Although 
the purchase agreement required the filing of a UCC -1 purchase money security interest, 
the seller-creditor delayed making the filing. Both parties agreed that this seller-creditor 
acquired an enforceable purchase money security interest in the unpaid balance of the 
press under 9-107(a) of the UCC. 
However, before the debtor could obtain possession of the press, the debtor 
obtained financing from a third party fiancier who filed an earlier UCC-1 financing 
statement on the same collateral. The initial purchase-money seller of the press argued 
that a debtor can only acquire rights in collateral one time during a purchase transaction, 
effectively precluding a second lender from acquiring a purchase money security interest 
in the same collateral. Rejecting this argument, the court held that the respective 
purchase money creditor acquired "different "rights' in the press at each successive 
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stage." The court held that the second creditor also qualified as a purchase money 
security interest because the second creditor under U C C 9-107(b) "enable[d] the debtor 
[to] acquire rights in or the use of collateral." This result lilvi.illy rniislnici the 
"enabling" provisions and suggests a similar result in the instant case. 
Much like the payments in Si. •''.. Av, ' .. .. obtaining 
possession of and title to the press ," the money advanced by Greenline enabled the debtor 
to retain possession i ne transaction extended 
a second level of purchase money status to the second purchase money security holder, 
just as the set\-i^1 • • * > • •,
 L x icnded purchase money status to a second 
creditor. Once Greenline had completed the purchase from New Holland, it refinanced 
tin I umbiik's K* mi 11 tic outstanding balance, just as the second creditor in 
Sutherland paid the outstanding balance necessary for the creditor to obtain possession. 
Grrpiiii,|iii„r " nj'Iiiiaiiet" enabled the debtor to "acquire rights in or the use of collateral," 
that they would have otherwise not been entitled to 1111m 11 r f, n 111 
Similarly, the court liberally construed the "to enable" U C C language in General 
Electric Capital Commercial Automotive *' n.*'- , . ^ 
..JU vO>. 246 A.D.2d 41 (New York. App . 1998). In General Electric a financier 
held a blanket lien on the debtor 's invmtr f nn In \\\ v tin PI liiililTliekl on till ul I he Tali 
Brother ' s existing and after-acquired property. Later the debtor signed a second security 
agreement with a new creditor to (iiiiim <• llu- <M>lnr',. in\ t/uh i After the second 
security agreement had been signed, the debtor purchased two Mercedes automobiles, for 
which the • - : uiu.ut a specific agreement requiring 
the reimbursement. The court observed that "many courts have been reluctant 
\\vM i |HIR*(KISC tnoii" * •euiii"'1, interest has been created where, as here, title to and 
possession of the merchandise have passed to the debtor before the loan is advanced." 
Citing Grant Gilmore, the court explained that then existing "UCC 9-107(b) was enacted 
at least in part to liberalize the rather rigid traditional rules, e.g., regarding the 
circumstances under which purchase money secured status could be obtained by a 
creditor who enables a debtor to acquire new inventory (see, Gilmore, The Purchase 
Money Priority, 76 Harv. L.Rev. 1333, at 1373 [1963])." 675 N.Y.S.2d at 631. Agreeing 
with Gilmore, the court observed: "the evident intent of paragraph (b) is to free the 
purchase money concept form artificial limitations; rigid adherence to particular 
formalities and sequences should not be required." Id. at 631. In answering how a 
transaction is to be evaluated to determine if it is sufficiently "closely allied" to the 
purchase transaction to justify extending purchase money status, the court held that the 
intent of the debtor and creditor is controlling transaction. Id. at 632. 
Also, in ThetMah & Assoc, V. First Bank of N.D., 336N.W.2d 134,138 (N.D. 
1983), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a bank created a PMSI when its 
advance of a binding commitment to issue funds enabled the debtor to enter into an 
equipment lease with a third party. Thet Mah, at 138. Given the fact that the debtor 
would have been unable to enter into the equipment lease without the binding 
commitment, the "enabling" requirement was met. Id. 
The results in the above "enabling" cases are also consistent with the rule 
recognized by United States Supreme Court authority in tax lien areas where a later 
advancement of purchase-money financing provides a priority for the loan even against a 
pre-existing lien on after-acquired property. In such cases the Court has stated: "a 
security interest based on the extension of purchase money defeats a previously filed 
federal tax lien." Slodovv, United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978). According to the 
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Supreme Court, "the [Internal Revenue] Code and established decisional principles 
subordinate the tax lien, to certain perfected security interest in ... collateral which is 
subject to a purchase-money mortgage regardless of whetlic "In1 w m i o n ! »vas entered 
imo heiore or after the filing of the tax lien." Slodov, 436 U.S. at 257-58. The Court 
explained that "[t]he purchase-money mortgage pnnufi, nSl h y at" |u<n I ecognition that 
the mortgagee's interest merely reflects his contribution of property to the taxpayer's 
estate and therefore does noi pioindn " \ lvAlt v« I"« M\: pnui in nine, .WIJI^V 4 'So U.S. 
at258n.23. 
CONCLUSION 
Beca* " \ .v, .. i. isc money refinancing of the New Holland original 
purchase money establishes a security priority in favor of Defendants, us i nutter i 
moi.n11nj; nl I I'liili "I"cult: Annotated Section 70A-9a-103(6)(c), the legislative intent 
underlying the statute, the common law interpretati* s >! 
IIJH nig requirement, the policy justifications of fairness and efficiency, and the language 
and liberal justification for purchase money * 'M <rn.« .giantingof 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be overruled and the case remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with recogm/w.i. I VrcnvL the refinanced 
debt that can be effectively traced to the original purchase money debt. 
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